



MEOHANIOS' LIEN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY.
(Continued from pn. 185, ante.)
V. PRIORITY.-SUBROGATION.-It is a universal rule, that a
prior lien gives a prior claim which is entitled to prior satisfaction
out of the subject it binds, unless the lien be intrinsically defective,
or be displaced by some act of the party holding it, which shall
postpone him, in a court of law or equity, to some subsequent
claimant: Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177.
A receiver is a person appointed for the preservation of the
fund or property pendente lite, and for its ultimate disposal accord-
ing to the rights and priorities of the parties; and the appoint-
ment of a receiver ordinarily gives no advantage or priority to the
person at whose request the appointment is made, over the parties
in interest: Ellis v. Boston, &c., Railway Co.,,107 Mass. 1; his
possession is subject to all valid and existing liens upon the pro-
perty at the time of his appointment, and does not divest a lien
previously acquired in good faith: Gere v. Dibble, 17 How. Pr.
31; In re . A, Gutta Percha Co., Id. 549; .Denniston v.
Chicago, fe., Railway Co., 4 Biss. 414. The rule in regard to
the priority of equities is that he who has the prior equity in point
of time has the prior right, and therefore a party resisting an
equity in order to maintain his defence, must protect himself
either under an older equity, or he must have purchased the legal
title bona fide, without notice, for a valuable consideration which
must have been paid.
The holder of a subsequent lien upon mortgaged chattels has
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the same right to protect his interest in the property as if the
prior lien be of any other nature, and may pay off the mortgage.
An execution-creditor, upon the payment of a chattel mortgage
which is a prior encumbrance upon the chattel on which his exe-
cution has been levied, is entitled to be subrogated to the rights
of the mortgage; and he has the right to demand and receive an
assignment of the mortgage, and the right to redeem from such
mortgage attaches as soon as a lien is acquired by the levy of the
execution, it is not. postponed till after sale on the execution :
Lucking v. Wesson, 25 Mich. 443.
VI. DuRATIoN.-The right to hold property by lien lasts until
the debt so secured is paid. The mechanics' lien on personal pro-
perty is simply a security for the payment of a debt. Statutes of
limitations being statutes of repose, suspend the remedy, but do
not cancel the debt; and, therefore, when the security for a debt
is a lien on property, either personal or real, the lien is not im-
paired in consequence of the debt being barred by the Statute of
Limitations: Higgins v. Scott, 2 13. & Ad. 413; Belknap v.
Gleason, 11 Conn. :160; Thayer v. M2u1nn, 19 Pick. 538; Spears
v. ffartly, 3 Esp. 81; Grain v. Paine, 4 Cush. 486; Joy v.
Adams, 26 Me. 330.
VII. ENFORCEMENT.-At common law, a sale of the property
to satisfy the debt secured by the lien, can be made only by the
consent of the ownerr; if consent cannot be obtained, resort must
be had to a court of equity: Fox v. McGregor, 11 Barb. 41.
It is obvious that in many cases where the care of the property
must be at the expense of the lien claimant, such remedy may be
inadequate. To cure such defect, the modern tendency is to in-
crease the efficiency of statute remedies, so as to make them ade-
quate for securing those rights which the law means to give. If,
however, the remedy given by statute is inadequate to secure the
rights given by a lien, resort must be had to proceedings in equity:
Cairo & Vincenres .Railway Co. v. lFackneil, 78 Ill. 116.
The proper action to be brought against one who has wrongfully
taken and retains possession of personal property, is that of tort :
JMatter of Hicks, 20 Mich. 280; Moses v. Arnold, 43 Iowa 187;
Watson v. Stever, 25 Mich. 386. But if one has taken possession
-of property and sold or disposed of it, and received money or
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money's worth therefor, the owner is nQt compellable to treat him
as a wrongdoer, but may affirm the sale as made in his behalf, and
demand, in an" action of assumpsit, the benefit of the transaction.
Damages for a trespass are not in general recoverable in assump-
sit: and in the case of taking personal property, it is generally
held essential that a sale by the defendant should be shown:
Stearns v. Dillingham, 22 Vt. 626; Smith v. Smith, 43 N. H.
536; Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44 Penn. St. 9; Glass Co. v. Wolcott,
2 Allen 227; Emerson v. Jilclramara, 41 Me. 565. And when-
ever trespass, trover or replevin will not lie, case can be sustained
wherever there has been a wrong done by the defendant and a
resulting injury to the plaintiff: Low v. lartin, 18 111. 290;
Upton v.. Vail, 6 Johns. 181; Griffin v. Farwell, 20 Vt. 151 ;
Ashby v. White, Ld. Raym. 938; Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term
R. 63; Sheldon v. .Faifax, 21 Vt. 102; Langqridge v. Levy, 2
M. & W. 519; Weatheiford v. Fishback, 3 Scam. 170; Bond v.
Hilton, Bushee (N. 0.) 308; Googins v. Gilmore, 47 Me. 9.
Property which is taken out of the operation of a chattel mortgage
by a fraudulent contrivance of the mortgagor, is to all intents and
purposes, wrongfully converted. The mortgagee loses it as effectu-
ally as if it had been destroyed or stolen: Fenn v. Bittleston, 8
Eng. L. & Eq. 483; Forbes v. Parker, 16 Pick. 462; Manning
v. Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 539.
That a mortgagee of personal property may sue for an injury
to his reversionary interest, see Googins v. Gilmore, 47 Me. 9;
Ayters v. Bartlett, 9 Pick. 156.
VIII. Wxivmt.-As the right of the lien-holder is merely that
of retaining possession of the property, the legal title to which is
in the general owner, any act not consistent with the right of pos-
session by the lien-claimant, or title of the owner, is considered as
a waiver of the lien: Black v. Bogrt, 65 N. Y. 601 ; ,Mcarland
v. Wheeler, 26 Wend. 467; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485; Gurr
v. Cuthbert, 12 L. J., Ex. 309; Bean v. Bolton, 3 Phila. R. 87;
Pickett v. Bullock, 52 N. H. 354; Kfitteridge v. Freeman, 48 Vt.
62. Therefore, a voluntary surrender of the possession of the
property subject to the lien, or a delivery to a third person, not
procured by fraud: Touch v. Wilson, 60 Ind. 64; or any other
act inconsistent with the lien-claimant's possession, is a waiver:
Hall v. Tuttle ? 8 Wend. 374; Waterston v. Getchell, 5 Greenl.
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435; ,Spartali v. Benecke 10 Com. B. 212; 19 L. J., 0. P.,
293. A lien-claimant, by parting with his dominion over the
property so as to put it beyond his power to suirender it on
demand to the general owner, on payment or tender of the debt,
loses all right of lien thereto: Ruggles v. Walker, 84 Vt. 470.
An express contract that a lien shall be retained to a specified
extent is equivalent to a waiver to any greater extent: Brown
v. Gilman, 4 Wheat. 255.
If one who has a lien on property for labor performed on it,
delivers it to the owner or his agent without insisting on holding
it as security, the lien is waived: ?uzqgles v. Walker, 84 Vt. 468;
Brackett v. Hayden, 3 Shepley 347; and the owner of the pro-
perty may sustain trespass for a. su.bsequent taking of the property
by a stranger: Bailey v. Quint, 22 Vt. 474. A voluntary
abandonment of the possession is a waiver: King v. Indian
Orchard, 4-c., 11 Cush. 281. The delivery of possession necessary
to divest a lien is such a delivery as would be sufficient under the
Statute of Frauds to transfer the title. Delivery of part of the pro-
perty subject to the lien does not impair the lien on the balance for
the whole amount due: Buggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468; Palmer
v. Tucker, 45 Me. 316; Partridge v. Trustees, &c., 5 N. H. 286.
A voluntary surrender of the possession with intent, express or
implied, is necessary to constitute a waiver. A delivery procured
by fraud does not destroy the right: Walcott .Keith, 2 Fost.
196 ; and if possession be regained without the doing of legal
wrong, the lien will be in force: Johnson v. The McJDonough,
1 Gilpin 101. A party who has relinquished a prior lien through
fraud practised on him, may rescind the agreement for relinquish-
ment, and retake the property by virtue of his prior lien: Lynch
v. Tibbitts, 24 Barb. 51. Delivery of property by the lien-
holder, and payment of the debt by the owner, are concurrent
acts, and neither party is bound to perform his part of the con-
tract unless the other is ready to perform the correlative act:
Prothingham v. Jenkins, 1 Cal. 42; Bigelow v. Hfeaton, 4 Denio
496. To destroy a lien, the surrender of the possession of the
property must be voluntary; but it may be sold on execution sub-
ject to the lien, and it seems the lien-holder may be required to
permit its exposure for sale in that manner; and if the lien-
claimant voluntarily surrenders the property to the officer who has
the execution against the owner, the officer may remove and sell
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the same, but not to the prejudice of the lien: Glassner v.
Wheaton, 2 E. D. Smith 352.
When possession of the property is demanded by the owner or
other person lawfully entitled to it, the party who claims the pos-
session by virtue of his lien should state its nature and amount:
Heine v. Anderson, 2 Duer 318; for if a ground of retention
different from that of the lien, and inconsistent therewith, is taken,
the lien ceases to exist: Hanna y. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21; and the
owner of the property may sue the lien-claimant and recover with-
out having first tendered to him the amount of the debt: Saltus
v. .Everett, 20 Wend. 267.
IX. DISCHARGE OR DETERMINATION.-The payment of the debt,
or performance of any obligation secured by the lien, will discharge
it. A tender of the amount secured by the lien is equivalent to
payment as to all things which are incidental to the debt. The
creditor, by refusing to accept, does not forfeit his right to the very
thing tendered, but he does lose all collateral benefits or securities.
The debt still remains, but the lien is gone absolutely and for ever:
Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 366, and cases cited; Mliek v. Wfil-
letts, 2 Kan. 385; Caruthers v. Humphreys, 12 Mich. 270;
Ladue v. D. 1 R 1ailway Co., 13 Mich. 393; Ketchurn v.
Crippen, 37 Cal. 223; and this rule applies to a lien created by
an execution: Tiffany v. St. John, 65 N. Y. 314.
A valid tender is a formal offer to perform that which ig due
from the party making the offer. In Moynahan v. Moore, 9
Mich. 9, it was decided that a tender of the amount due, on con-
dition that the property be delivered up, is not a conditional, but
a valid, tender. The facts were that the plaintiff employed the
defendant to repair a carriage, and the defendant retained the
carriage, under a mechanic's lien, for the amount due him for
making such repairs. To obtain possession of the property, the
plaintiff tendered, as the jury found, sufficient to discharge the
lien. On the facts thus presented the court says, "This tender
necessarily operated to release the property, and the plaintiff was
entitled to immediate possession of it. That such would be the
effect of an unconditional tender is not doubted; but, as the tender
in this case was made upon condition that the carriage should be
delivered up, it is thought that it has not such effect. A tender
made to procure the possession of property can hardly be called
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conditional because it is accompanied by a demand for the pro-'
perty. But it does not appear that any objection was made to
the tender by the defendant, except for insufficiency-he demand-
ing more than the sum offered; and, as the jury find that'sufficient
was tendered, the tender was good, even were the strictest rule to
prevail, upon the established principle that the objection made
at the time of tender precludes all others; and if that be not well
grounded, the tender will be held good." The tender' being suf-
ficient, the lien was lost, and the owner was held entitled to main-
tain an action of replevin for his property without payment of the
tender into court; the court saying upon this point, "Were this
an action by the defendant to recover compensation for the repairs,
the want of the money in court would render the tender nugatory,
as the effect of tender in such cases is to stay interest and relieve
from costs, and therefore the party making the tender must always
have the money within reach of his creditor. But in this case the
tender having once operated to discharge the lien, it is gone for-
ever, and nothing could revive it. The reasons which require the
money to be brought into court do not apply in such a case. By
refusing to receive the money tendered, the defendant lost his lien,
and can only rely upon the personal liability of the plaintiff.
A lien may be lost by releasing property upon the mere request
of a third party who promises to pay the debt for which the pro-
perty is held, although such promise is not binding, because it is
collateral and within the Statute of Frauds, which requires such
an undertaking to be evidenced by writing: IIIallory v. Gillett,
21 N. Y. 412; Corkins v. Collins, 16 Mich. 478. A lien may be
lost by negligence: Hanna v. Holton, 78 Penn. St. 384; and a
lien is discharged, the performance of which has been fraudulently
prevented by the lien-claimant: Careyt v. Brown, 92 U. S. 171.
X. WHO MAY SUE FOR INJuRy.-Either the genera] owner-or
the party who holds the property under the lien, may maintain an
action in respect to it against a wrongdoer: Green v. Clarke, 12
N. Y. 348; -Edwards v. Pfrank, 40 Mich. 616; the latter by
virtue of his right or possession: Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal.
546 ; the former by reason of his ownership: Crouch v. Bailway
Co., 2 Car. & K. 801. If property in the possession of the lienor
is destroyed without his fault he may recover the debt: ussell v.
Ko'ehler, 66 Ill. 459. When property to which a party has, by
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statute, a lien, but not the right of possession, is destroyed or so
changed by a stranger that the lienor cannot enforce his lien, he
may maintain an action on the case against the wrongdoer:
Russey, Adrn'r, v. Peebles' 53 Ala. 432.
XI. WHo MAY BE SUED FOR INJURY.-Upon tender of pay-
ment by the owner, the lien ceases: Tiffany v. St. John, 65
N. Y. 314; Illogynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; and if the party
holding under the lien refuses to return the property, the owner
may recover the possession, or sue for a conversion: Stearns v.
3ifarsh, 4 Denio 227. The owner may maintain a joint action
against both the bailee and his agent, or a separate action against
either, for an injury caused by the negligence of the agent:
Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78; and a recovery either by the
owner or the bailee is a bar to another action by other parties:
Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236. If the owner refuses to perform
his part of the contract, he may be sued and the property retained
as collateral security until the debt shall be recovered: Jones v.
Conde, 6 Johns. Oh. 77; Payne v. Hlarrell, 40 Miss. 498;
Gerrard v. Moody, 48 Ga. 96. A suit may be maintained against
a party through whose negligence a lien has been lost: Ranna
v. ifolton, 78 Penn. St. 334; ifalp)in v. 1Tall, 42 Wis. 176.
XII. DAMAGES RECOVERALE.-When suit is brought by the
owner for conversion, against a defendant who has a lien on the
property to secure a debt, the amount of the lien should be
deducted from the value of the property: Chamberlain v. Shaw,
18 Pick. 283; Outealt v. Darling, 25 N. J. L. 443; Neiler v.
Kelley, 69 Penn. St. 403. But when the plaintiff has a lien, and
is responsible to a third party, or if the defendant is not entitled
to the balance of the value of the property subject to the lien, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the whole value: Ohamberlain v.
Shaw, 18 Pick. 278; Adams v. O'Connor, 100 Mass. 515;
Davidson. v. Gunsolly, 1 Mich. 388.
If the plaintiff has only a lien on the property, and the defend-
ant is the owner subject only to the lien, the plaintiff can recover
only the .amount of his claim: White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302;
Brownell v. Hawkins, 4 Barb. 491 ; but against a stranger, if he
had possession or the legal title for the purposes of his lien, he
can recover full value of the property: Adams v. O'Connor, 100
Mass. 515; White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302.
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In an action of replevin, whatever damages have been actually
sustained, may be recovered: Gibbs v. Cruickshank, Law Rep.,
8 C. P. 454, 460. Therefore, where the property in controversy
has a usable value, the value of the use of the property during its
wrongful detention is a proper item : Yandle v. Kingsbury, 17
Kan. 195; Allen v. Fox, 51 N. Y. 567; Butler v. Mehrling, 15
Ill. 488; WilliamW v. Phelps, 16 Wis. 80; and in some cases,
deterioration of the property from injury, neglect or other causes :
Washington Ins. (Go. v. Webster, 62 Me. 341, must be considered;
also, oppression and vexation may be regarded: iferdic v. Young,
55 Penn. St. 176; Cable v. Dakin, 20 Wend. 172; see Stevens
v. Tuttle, 104 Mass. 328, 335. In an action of replevin., the
plaintiff continues to be the absolute owner of the property, if he
was the owner previously, and he cannot elect in such action to
take the value of the property instead of the property : Wilson v.
Fuller, 9 Kan. 176. In an action of trover, the plaintiff elects
to consider the property taken, if the property is still in existence,
as having become the property of the defendant, and he himself
is the owner of nothing but the mere value of the property, which
value he seeks to recover, with legal rate of interest thereon : Id.
The plaintiff must have the legal title to the property in question,
and must show possession or the right to immediate possession.
It is not enough that he shows an equitable title, such as a right
to redeem, or a reversionary interest: Ring v. N"'eale, 114 Mass.
111.
When property is sold by a lien-holder contrary to the terms of
the contract by which the lien was created, the measure of damages
is the market value of the property at the time it was sold: Bel-
den v. Perkins, 78 Ill. 449. When an action is brought against
the lien-holder for the value of the property sold, he may recoup
the amount of the debt secured by the lien : Belden v. Perkins,
supra. And see James v. Rogers, 15- Mass. 389 ; Stearns v.
Marsh, 4 Denio 227; Platt v. Brand, 26 Mich. 17.5. And the
same rule applies where suit is brought against the purchaser:
Belden v. Perkins, supra, and a defendant may recoup the amount
of damage occasioned by the negligence of the bailee: Sargent v.
Slack, 47 Vt. 674.
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